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Disclaimer
The information contained in this publication is intended for general use, to assist 
public knowledge and discussion and to help improve the sustainable management 
of land, water and vegetation. It includes general statements based on scientific 
research. Readers are advised and need to be aware that this information may be 
incomplete or unsuitable for use in specific situations. Before taking any action 
or decision based on the information in this publication, readers should seek 
expert professional, scientific and technical advice and form their own view of the 
applicability and correctness of the
information.
To the extent permitted by law, the Commonwealth of Australia, Land & Water 
Australia (including its employees and consultants), and the authors of this 
publication do not assume liability of any kind whatsoever resulting from any 
person’s use or reliance upon the content of this publication.1
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Abstract
Competitive tenders, a form of market-based instrument (MBI), provide a cost 
effective policy tool for allocating payments for ecosystem services. This report 
describes the application of competitive tenders to conservation corridors and 
other landscape-scale objectives which require coordinated actions by landholders. 
Running tenders over a number of rounds, with opportunities for landholders to 
modify their bids between rounds based on information provided to them about the 
location of other bids across the landscape, can facilitate corridor formation. The 
competitive nature of the tender is maintained, particularly if the number of rounds 
is unknown in advance and participants are not able to increase their price if they 
find themselves in a potential corridor. Bid assessment is a complex process, as the 
value of any one bid depends on what other bids are also in the final package. It is 
therefore necessary to calculate the value of each possible combination of bids for 
the landscape as a whole, accounting for habitat condition and management, as well 
as connectivity and complementarity where appropriate. This project also provides 
recommendations on the design and implementation of competitive tenders to 
ensure optimal participation by landholders, and on the use of simulated tender 
exercises in workshops with potential tender participants as a valuable engagement 
tool.
Accompanying publications (produced solely through this project):
Policy brief – Competitive tenders at the landscape scale (to be published online 
and disseminated through MBI networks)
Policy brief – Optimising landholder participation in competitive tenders 
(published online and disseminated through MBI networks)
Paper – Barriers to and Opportunities for Increasing Participation in Conservation 
Auctions (published online; version to be submitted to academic journal)
Paper – Applying Competitive Tenders for the Provision of Ecosystem Services at 
the Landscape Scale (to be published online and submitted to academic journal)
Paper – Ecological Metrics for Evaluating Landscape Scale Outcomes from 
Competitive Tenders (to be published online and submitted to academic journal)
Report – Interactive experimental workshops (disseminated through MBI networks; 
to be published online)
Report – Mission Beach Stakeholder Workshop (disseminated to stakeholders)
These publications will be available shortly on the CSIRO website. 3
Related publications:
Conference paper – Designing auctions for conservation corridors: An 
experimental approach (Contributed to Australian Agricultural and Resource 
Economics Society conference, Canberra, February 2008)
Conference paper – Current, pre-clearing and 2025 scenarios of vegetation 
cover and cassowary habitat in Mission Beach and Surrounds (Marine and Tropical 
Scientific Research Facility Conference, Cairns, April/May 2008) (combining 
outputs from this and other projects)
Conference paper – Potential gaps in the complementary representation of 
regional ecosystems within protected areas of the Wet Tropics NRM region 
(Marine and Tropical Scientific Research Facility Conference, Cairns, April/May 
2008) (combining outputs from this and other projects)
Project poster - Accounting for vegetation condition in the landscape: An 
approach in the Tully-Murray using VAST criteria and GIS (Townsville, June 2007).
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Introduction
Payments for ecosystem services are increasingly being applied to promote 
conservation and other environmental policy goals. Auctions, or competitive 
tenders, are a proven method of efficiently allocating limited amounts of funding 
for such payments (Latacz-Lohmann & van der Hamsvoort 1998; Stoneham et 
al. 2003; Windle & Rolfe 2008). A typical competitive tender involves landholders 
submitting bids to carry out conservation activities. They have some flexibility 
around the details of their bid proposal, and they are also free to choose their 
price. The purchaser in a tender (typically an NRM or conservation agency) ranks 
the bids in terms of value for money. Just as in any other market, the agency will 
first purchase those projects which offer the best value for money, and keep going 
until all funds are allocated (or a target or cut-off point is reached). Landholders 
whose bids are accepted are contracted to carry out their conservation project. 
The competitive nature of the auction mechanism encourages landholders 
to reveal their private information by submitting bids at or around their true 
opportunity cost of providing conservation.
Tenders have been applied for a range of ecosystem services. They fit in well with 
existing NRM institutional arrangements as they make best use of an amount 
of money allocated to a particular issue, and do not generally require special 
statutory arrangements. In order to rank the offers made by landholders in an 
auction, a metric is required to measure and compare the level of environmental 
benefits provided by alternative bids. This means the auction mechanism selects 
the individual projects which provide the best value for money, in terms of 
environmental outcomes per dollar requested. However, by focussing at the level 
of the individual property, this approach may select conservation projects which 
are scattered across a landscape.
In many cases there is a need for a landscape-scale approach to the provision of 
ecosystem services. In the case of biodiversity conservation, connectivity between 
conserved sites facilitates the dispersal of fauna and seeds, potentially increasing 
the contribution of individual projects to viable populations. The desired spatial 
configuration of conservation actions will depend on the characteristics of the 
target species or community, such as dispersal ability and range requirements. 
Some degree of habitat connectivity is required for most conservation outcomes 
in the short term. In the medium and long term, connectivity is likely to be of 
even greater importance, allowing species and communities to progressively 
adjust their ranges in response to climate change.
Project objectives
The objectives of this project were to advance and refine techniques for the design 
and implementation of competitive tenders to deliver cost-effective conservation at 
the landscape scale. This requires a number of separate issues to be addressed. Firstly 
the auction mechanisms within the tender process must be adapted to facilitate the 
coordination required for individual landholders to collectively deliver connected 
conservation projects in a cost-effective manner. Secondly, ecological metrics 
incorporating connectivity must be developed in order to select the best possible 
package of bids. These issues are considered in sections three and four. Section five 
considers landholder participation in tenders, since landscape-scale objectives can 
only be achieved if sufficient individual landholders are prepared to take part. Section 
six reports on methods of engagement with potential tender participants, which can 
in part facilitate high levels of landholder participation. Applications of the research 
to specific case studies in northern Queensland and New South Wales are described 
in section seven. Section eight presents the resulting policy recommendations for 
the application of competitive tenders to landscape scale conservation. There is an 
accompanying paper for each section of this report to which readers may refer for a 
more complete account of the research undertaken in this project.
Auction mechanisms
(see doc – Applying competitive tenders for the provision of ecosystem services…)
Multi-round auctions, in which landholders are provided with information on the 
location of offers from the previous round, have the potential to promote the 
coordination required to achieve landscape connectivity (Rolfe et al. 2005). Between 
rounds landholders are provided with information showing the location of offers 
made in the previous round. They then have the opportunity to modify their offer, 
or submit a new offer, in order to better coordinate with their neighbours and 
so increase their chances of success in the tender. However, auctions work by 
compelling landholders to compete, thereby revealing their costs and enabling the 
purchaser to select those projects with the lowest cost per unit of biodiversity. 
There is a danger that a mechanism intended to promote coordination among 
landholders may at the same time reduce competition. For example, neighbours 
may collude on price, or an individual at a key node in a potential corridor may 
be tempted to submit an offer well in excess of costs. Such behaviour will erode 
the efficiency gains achievable in an auction, and could result in the environmental 
objective not being met.
A critical problem in corridor formation is individuals not participating, or holding 
out for excessively high prices. In this form of iterated auction there will be greater 
opportunity for participants to identify and work around such hold-outs. Where 
there are many different ways of forming a corridor across a landscape, corridors 6
can evolve over multiple rounds according to the bidding behaviour of individual 
landholders. Iterated auctions can potentially deliver coordinated actions across 
a number of properties without requiring individual or group level negotiations. 
A confidential discriminate price mechanism means that different landholders can 
be paid different amounts based on their opportunity costs, whereas in collective 
negotiations it is likely that all would seek the same payment, which would have 
to be at least as much as the highest individual opportunity cost (see Rolfe et al. 
200).
Minor details in the design of auctions and other market institutions can have a 
major impact on market performance (e.g. Klemperer 2002). Economic theory 
provides limited guidance as to the design of iterated auctions for conservation, 
necessitating an alternative approach. Experimental economics provides a 
methodology for integrating human decision-making behaviour with economic 
theory. Experiments were run to test a range of alternative auction design rules. 
Results indicate that iterated auctions can deliver coordinated outcomes, and 
work most efficiently where the number of rounds is unknown to participants 
in advance, and provisional winners cannot raise their prices. An agency may run 
the tender over a number of rounds, stopping once a desired target is reached. 
Clearly transaction costs will increase with the number of rounds. Allowing bids 
to automatically carry over from one round to the next minimises the impost 
of the iterated process. Uncertainty about whether any particular round will be 
the last minimises strategic bidding, which actually means that only two or three 
rounds are likely to be required. These simple rules can enable complex landscape 
scale objectives to be achieved in a relatively straightforward and cost effective 
manner.
Ecological metrics incorporating connectivity
An important principle of landscape ecology is that the size, shape and spatial 
relationships of land cover types influences the dynamics of populations, 
communities and ecosystems. The ability to describe and quantify landscape 
structure and connectivity is necessary to successfully characterise ecological 
processes and prioritise habitat networks for conservation management. 
The biophysical outcome from a tender is only as good as the metric used to 
assess the bids. Landscape-scale tenders require metrics which can account for 
connectivity and complementarity across the landscape, as well as the value of 
each individual site.
The spatial links method and tools developed by Drielsma et al. (2007a,b) enable 
automated mapping of habitat linkages in the landscape. The link value of an 
individual site is combined 4
with connectivity measures from metapopulation ecology (Hanski 1994; Hanski 
1999) and the least cost path algorithm from graph theory (Dijkstra 199; 7
Drielsma et al. 2007a), resulting in continuously variable landscape data. Data 
and expert opinion are used to indicate the range of distances across various 
habitat qualities (different environments and disturbance levels) that an individual 
creature would move, on average, within a day. The estimate of distance may be 
constrained to particular lifecycle phases such as breeding. Different distance-
decay parameters are therefore derived depending on the life history and 
movement behaviour of a species.
In conservation planning, complementarity is a measure of the contribution an 
area makes to the full complement of biodiversity features: species, assemblages, 
ecological processes, etc (Vane-Wright et al. 1991; Margules et al. 1988; Pressey et 
al. 1993; Margules & Pressey 2000; Margules & Sarkar 2007). This means that the 
conservation value of any given location in a region is assessed not only in terms 
of the attributes of that location (e.g. local species or ecosystem richness, patch 
size and connectivity), but also in terms of the contribution that location makes 
to regional biodiversity in combination with other areas. Complementarity can 
be applied in many ways. Spatial information needs to be collated and decisions 
need to be made about the data inputs including a surrogate for biodiversity such 
as vegetation mapping or models, a target or goal for the amount of each type 
to be represented, and a benchmark against which progress is measured, such as 
the amount of biodiversity within existing conservation areas (e.g. national parks 
and protected areas). Furthermore, the quality and configuration of habitats, or 
their ‘intactness’ (sensu Scholes & Biggs 200; Faith et al. 2008), in fragmented 
landscapes has medium to long-term implications for biodiversity persistence and 
complementarity outcomes.
Our metric framework integrates landscape connectivity and complementarity 
measures and interacts with the auction process through spatial scenario analyses 
of landscape condition change. Given information about current condition of the 
landscape, the change achieved through the provision of conservation is used to 
assess the change in effective habitat area. Landscape condition is updated using 
a state-transition modelling framework (Drielsma & Ferrier 2006) incorporating 
edge-effects and other phenomena that negatively impact on biodiversity (Ferrier 
& Drielsma in prep.). Future effective habitat area is analysed in terms of change in 
connectivity and complementarity measured as a landscape outcome. Weights for 
combining the two measures are set within the objectives of the tender.
This landscape scenarios framework allows the various bids submitted in a 
conservation tender to be assessed to select the combination which offers 
the best possible biodiversity outcome within a given budget limit. The process 
requires a spatially-explicit and dynamic modelling framework and reasonable 
accuracy in the way landscape ecological and biodiversity processes are 
represented. Like many combinatorial modelling problems, the computation issues 
require the development of specialised but user-oriented software to ensure the 
methods can be adapted by NRM and conservation agencies.8
Landholder participation in tenders
(see doc – Barriers to and opportunities for increasing participation…)
As competitive tenders are increasingly applied around Australia as policy 
instruments for achieving voluntary land-use change there is a perception 
that landholders can be reluctant to participate. This is a fundamental concern 
as tenders are reliant on competition between participants to secure the 
efficiency dividend that they promise. However, examining case studies of 
tender applications indicates that participation, while sometimes apparently 
low, has usually been sufficient for the tender to achieve its goals. High levels of 
participation may be particularly important to achieve certain landscape scale 
objectives – for example it is unlikely that a wildlife corridor can be formed 
if only a small number of landholders submit bids. It is therefore important 
to consider landholder participation throughout the process of designing and 
implementing a competitive tender.
In narrow economic terms, increased participation will lead to greater economic 
efficiency and increased environmental outcomes per dollar of public investment 
on-ground, which is a desirable outcome in itself. However there is a downside 
in the form of higher administration and transaction costs and a greater 
proportion of unsuccessful bidders. Therefore agencies should aim to optimise 
rather than maximise participation. The optimal level of participation will depend 
on the amount of money to be allocated and the objectives of the tender. If the 
available funding is likely to be sufficient to contract with only a small number of 
landholders, then clearly there is less to be gained from having a large number of 
bids. However if the objective of the tender is to form a wildlife corridor there 
will be stronger benefits from increased participation rates.
A target for participation should therefore be set early on in the process of 
implementing a competitive tender. The ideal number of bids will depend on a 
number of factors, including how much variation there is among landholders in 
terms of their costs of providing the ecosystem service, the transaction costs 
incurred in submitting a bid (for both the agency and landholder) and the likely 
impact of unsuccessful bids on future landholder actions and engagement. As a 
very rough approximation for a basic tender, if there are around 1.5-2 times as 
many bids as can be funded then there will have been strong competition without 
an excessive number of losers.
Having set a target for participation, the next task is to identify if there is likely to 
be a problem meeting the target. This will determine what, if any, actions should 
be undertaken to increase participation rates (or avoid excessive participation). 
Focussing on a land management issue which has a closer alignment with existing 
landholder aspirations is likely to increase participation rates. However by 9
definition alignment should never be complete, otherwise there would be no case 
for incentive payments. Rather, an agency should look to achieve its objectives 
in ways which most closely align with landholder interests. In some cases an 
extension-style communication strategy may be of benefit in demonstrating to 
landholders that a new management practice does align with their objectives.
Competitive tenders offer opportunities to landholders, financial and otherwise. 
Clearly the more money on offer, the more people are likely to get involved. 
To some extent participation rates are likely to be self-regulating, based on 
landholder perceptions of the amount of funding available and the number of 
people likely to take part. Tenders also provide non-financial opportunities such 
as knowledge, support and recognition in changing management practices which 
may be emphasised if they are believed to be important to landholders. Local 
bodies with a strong community presence are generally best placed to engage with 
landholders. A site visit by a knowledgeable field officer can provide landholders 
with clear expectations about the process and greatly facilitates their engagement 
with it – this is generally the most important part of the engagement process.
Contract length is a difficult issue in any tender. Experience indicates that most 
landholders generally prefer shorter duration contracts (i.e. < years), and are 
particularly wary of binding permanent agreements (e.g. covenants), although 
the opposite is the case for some conservation-focussed landholders. Longer 
contracts provide greater certainty in terms of any ongoing incentive payments. 
However, for production-oriented landholders, longer contracts may involve more 
exposure to uncertainty such as changes in management costs or commodity 
prices. Laboratory economic experiments were carried out to examine how 
uncertainty affects decisions regarding length of contract. These showed that, 
all things being equal, the greater the variability in opportunity costs from year 
to year, the shorter the contract length sought by experimental participants. As 
well as preferring shorter contracts, participants also sought higher prices as 
uncertainty increased, incorporating a risk premium into their bids.
Conserved land is likely to require ongoing management for pests and weeds, the 
costs of which are difficult to quantify in advance as they are impacted by many 
factors behind the control of an individual landholder. Native vegetation therefore 
has the potential to represent an ongoing liability. Where weeds and pests are 
a significant issue, conservation agencies might consider policies to control 
them in native vegetation at the district level, rather than leaving it to individual 
landholders. As well as being more effective and efficient in their own right, such 
efforts would also minimise the ongoing costs of maintaining ‘unproductive’ native 
vegetation for landholders. In other cases uncertainty may be reduced by linking 
ongoing incentive payments to management costs (e.g. the price of water required 
to maintain a wetland) or commodity prices (e.g. where cattle production is 
scaled back to maintain native vegetation). If such uncertainties can be reduced, 10
the evidence suggests landholders will be willing to enter into longer contracts at lower 
prices.
Experience of any incentive scheme will affect perceptions and expectations of future 
schemes. This is particularly relevant for competitive tenders, in which there will 
inevitably be unsuccessful participants. The impact of being unsuccessful may be limited 
if constructive feedback can be provided. In many cases there may be alternative 
schemes available to which they could be directed. It is important to continue the 
engagement process beyond simply announcing the tender results in order to maintain 
relationships and build support for future initiatives.
Engagement with potential tender participants
(see doc – Interactive experimental workshops)
Conservation tenders are grounded in ecological and economic science. However 
science alone cannot design a tender, nor communicate it to stakeholders. Engaging 
with landholders and other stakeholders is a key part of the process. A valuable tool 
for facilitating this engagement is the use of participatory experimental workshops. This 
approach builds on laboratory experimental economics to provide participants with a 
hands-on demonstration of the tender process by running through a simulated tender 
exercise. Such workshops can be used to test, communicate and seek feedback on 
proposed tender mechanisms.
In particular, experimental workshops provide a valuable training tool. Tenders are 
often a novel incentive mechanism, both for landholders and those charged with 
communicating and implementing them. These workshops can familiarise potential 
participants, administrators and communicators with the way in which the mechanism 
works, and why it is being applied. They can also provide information which assists 
people in formulating an offer. Attending such a workshop can increase the likelihood 
of participation in a subsequent tender as well as increasing the quality of bids (Windle 
& Rolfe 2006). Interactive workshops are therefore a recommended step in the 
implementation of tenders. However, they do involve costs, both for landholders and 
agencies, which must be traded-off against the potential benefits.
The key aspect of designing and running a workshop with stakeholders is to focus on 
the desired objective. Different approaches are required for eliciting information and 
testing tender mechanisms. Equally, when the objective is communication, it is important 
to consider exactly which aspects to focus on, in order to ensure that the right message 
is communicated. Face to face contact with stakeholders is almost always valuable, and 
can facilitate future interactions. Additionally, workshops provide a good opportunity 
to encourage landholders to sign up for the next stage of a tender, such as a site visit, 
and thus assist in moving potential participants through from expressing interest in a 
scheme to full participation.11
Case studies
(see doc – Mission Beach workshop)
This project included ecological and economic components to address various 
aspects of the design and implementation of competitive tenders for landscape-scale 
conservation. Case studies were developed based on real world scenarios in order 
to test how these various components could be integrated, as will be necessary to 
achieve real policy outcomes. The Mission Beach study area straddles the Wet Tropics 
World Heritage Area and has been identified as a priority area for natural resource 
management in general, and biodiversity conservation in particular. The predominant 
land use is urban and residential along the coastal margins with cropping and grazing 
in the agricultural zones. Rural-residential blocks are scattered throughout the 
coastal and hinterland regions usually backing onto forest edges, and development 
pressures mean there is a risk of further habitat fragmentation. Large tracts of forest 
lie among and between these areas, some of which is protected.
The cassowary is an iconic species of the region, and is listed nationally as 
endangered. Their large size and varied habitat requirements mean that connectivity 
is particularly important for cassowary populations. A variety of corridor plans 
developed by government and non-government organisations identify key local and 
regional linkages among habitats potentially frequented by cassowary (Latch 2007). 
While extensive areas of habitat are protected within National Parks and World 
Heritage Areas, much of the remaining habitat identified for corridor management 
is managed by private landholders. An ecological metric was developed based on 
habitat condition, connectivity and complementarity.
In April 2008 a series of conservation incentive workshops were held in the 
region. The workshops involved presentation and discussion of competitive 
tenders and their role in NRM policy, followed by a simulated tender exercise. 
This exercise was based on the landscape around Garners Beach, to the north of 
Mission Beach, involving 40 hypothetical properties (loosely based around actual 
property boundaries). Participants were asked to take on the role of landholder 
for a hypothetical property and submit a bid in a conservation tender. Maps were 
provided for each property, showing vegetation and current land uses. In this 
exercise tenders were submitted for 29 of the 0 hypothetical properties. The farm 
maps were translated into GIS layers for tender evaluation. Scenarios of land use 
change (e.g. revegetation, regrowth management, remnant protection) were created 
for each tender, applicable to a 10 year restoration cycle in the wet tropics, by 
assuming ‘best practice’ conservation actions were applied.
The tender mechanism was well received by workshop participants, who considered 
it to have good potential to contribute to NRM in the region. Bids submitted in the 
tender exercise were run through the metric developed for the region. The required 
level of computation proved even lengthier than expected. However, it did prove 12
possible to select the best package while accounting for a range of assessment 
criteria including habitat condition, connectivity, complementarity.
A second case study was developed based on long-nosed potoroo populations 
on the north coast of NSW (in collaboration with Mick Andren of NSW DECC). 
There are similar issues of habitat fragmentation under intense development 
pressure. However, potoroos have a much smaller range and hence higher 
population densities than cassowary, so metapopulation dynamics are more 
important in this case. The auction and metric will be demonstrated in a 
workshop with policy makers and other stakeholders in the region in the next 
few months. (This has been delayed due to a number of key people leaving their 
positions recently, with new appointments yet to be made.) This workshop will 
focus on policy makers rather than landholders as, unlike Mission Beach, there is 
little likelihood of a real tender being rolled out in the foreseeable future.
Policy recommendations
(see doc – Policy brief)
Competitive tenders can be applied to provide a cost-effective mechanism for 
achieving biodiversity corridors and other desired mixes of ecosystem services 
provision
Tenders for landscape-scale outcomes should be run over multiple rounds with 
the number of rounds unknown to participants in advance; participants should 
not be able to increase their prices from round to round
Metrics for landscape-scale conservation tenders must be based on 
sound ecological knowledge, and account for condition, connectivity and 
complementarity where relevant
Bid assessment will require computational methods such as simulated annealing 
to make the solution space tractable
For any sort of tender, it is necessary to consider how to engage with 
landholders at all stages of design and implementation in order to get the optimal 
level of participation, for both current and future schemes
Interactive experimental workshops are recommended as a method for 
engaging with landholders for whom the tender process is unfamiliar


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Communication and adoption
(see doc – Impact and influence reporting)
Communication and engagement has been extensive throughout this project. We 
have engaged directly with policy makers at local, state and federal levels. We have 
also talked directly with landholders. There has been some media coverage, including 
an interview on ABC Rural, with further media releases planned following the 
conclusion of the project. Our reports will be disseminated through our networks, 
and will shortly appear on a dedicated project webpage within the CSIRO website. 
We have written two policy briefs to facilitate adoption of our outputs by policy 
makers. We will continue to disseminate our research results and encourage NRM 
practitioners to adopt competitive tenders for landscape-scale outcomes over 
the coming months and years. Please see the attached document for more details 
regarding our communication activities.
Commercial potential
None envisaged
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